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This study addresses an essential characteristic of the EU legal order: its legislation is 
multilingual and equally authentic in all language versions. In this paper, I use corpus 
analysis to examine the issue of divergences between language versions that come to 
light in EU case-law. This paper pursues three specific objectives: 1) to study the use of 
comparison between language versions by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU), 2) to consider the methods of interpretation that the CJEU applies when 
considering multilingualism, and 3) to delve into the types of divergences and try to 
elucidate whether they can be attributed to translation problems. This applied study 
helps to shed light on the implications multilingualism has for the creation and 
interpretation of EU law. In order to understand how legal translation and 
interpretation actually work in the EU, I adopt a reasoned approach to face the 
challenges posed by the multilingual architecture of EU law, a new way of thinking 
that considers linguistic issues as important as legal issues. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When studying the legal nature of the EU it is common to highlight the 
binding character of EU legislation and its invocability or direct effect. In this 
study, I emphasise another important feature of EU legislation: the fact that 
it is multilingual and equally authentic in all language versions.1 EU law 
produces rights and obligations for individuals and this 'justifies the 
rendering of the legislation in all official languages', as a way to ensure equality 
before the law.2 
As a consequence, translation plays a fundamental role in the development 
and application of multilingual EU law. Translators create texts that are 
legally binding;3 they are key actors in law-making because drafting takes 
                                                 
1 See Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health 
EU:C:1982:335, para 18. 
2 Lucie Pacho Aljanati, The Court of Justice of the European Union's case law on linguistic 
divergences (2007-2013): interpretation criteria and implications for the translation of EU 
legislation. Doctoral thesis 2015, available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10803/314190 
3 On the role of translators as text producers, see, for example, Susan Šarčević, New 
Approach to Legal Translation (Kluwer Law International 1997); Susan Šarčević, 
'Challenges to the Legal Translator' in Peter M. Tiersma and Lawrence. M. Solan 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Language and Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 191. 
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place through translation.4 Therefore, the creation of EU legislation includes 
the work of drafters, translators and lawyer-linguists, who normally act as 
legal revisers and supervise the linguistic concordance of the language 
versions.5  The term 'language version' is used instead of 'translation' because 
all EU texts are equally authoritative. But can rules carry identical legal 
implications in all languages? Divergences between the different languages 
are inevitable. In case of doubt, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) is responsible for interpreting EU law (Art. 267 TFEU) and acts as the 
guarantor of uniform application and interpretation of EU legislation, always 
based on the premise that all versions constitute the same legal instrument.  
In this paper, I use corpus analysis6 to examine issues of divergences that 
come to light in EU case-law. Searches in the CVRIA database were carried 
out using the key term 'language versions'. This allows the retrieval of cases 
in which different language versions were invoked. The period chosen covers 
01/01/2017 until 30/06/2017. This corpus analysis pursues three specific 
objectives. First, I study the use of comparison between language versions. I 
observe whether comparison is used to reconcile diverging language versions 
or to support an interpretation when no divergences are present (Section II). 
Second, I consider the methods of interpretation that the CJEU applies. For 
this, I divide cases into two main groups: those involving linguistic criteria of 
interpretation and those resorting to metalinguistic criteria of interpretation 
(Section III). Metalinguistic methods attempt to reconcile diverging texts by 
referring to the system and the purpose of the texts, that is to say, applying 
criteria that go beyond the linguistic level and make it possible to solve the 
problem without having to choose among the language versions.7 Section III 
                                                 
4 See Ingemar Strandvik, 'EU Translation – Legal Translation in Multilingual 
Lawmaking', Conference proceedings: The Eleventh International FIT/EULITA 
Forum: The Life of Interpreters and Translators - Joy and Sorrow? 
5 On the shared legal-linguistic revision, see, for instance, Manuela Guggeis and 
William Robinson, 'Co-revision': Legal-Linguistic Revision in the European Union 
'Co-decision' Process' in Cornelis Jaap W. Baaij (ed), The Role of Legal Translation 
in Legal Harmonisation (Wolters Kluwer 2012) 51 and Aljanati (n 2) 64. 
6 A corpus typically implies a finite body of texts, sampled to be maximally 
representative and able to be stored electronically. See Tony McEnery and Andrew 
Wilson, Corpus Linguistics (Edinburgh University Press 2007) 29. 
7 Pierre Pescatore 'Interprétation des lois et conventions plurilingues dans la 
Communauté européenne' (1984) 25(4) Les Cahiers de Droit 996. 
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also deals with interpretive techniques to solve divergences. It explores the 
issue of legal certainty in relation to multilingualism. Finally, I delve into the 
types of divergences and try to elucidate whether they can be attributed to 
translation problems. In addition, the examples shed light on the way the 
CJEU constructs meaning (Section IV). 
This applied study brings to light some of the implications that 
multilingualism has for the creation and interpretation of EU law. I sustain 
that, in order to understand how legal translation and interpretation actually 
work in the EU, it is necessary to adopt a new way of thinking, which regards 
not only legal matters but also linguistic ones. Thus, I adopt a non-positivist 
perspective to address how meaning is construed and how legal certainty is 
reconciled with multilingualism.8 These research questions necessitate 
interdisciplinary insights. I adopt an approach that deals with judicial 
interpretation from a linguistic perspective, regarding translation as key for 
the existence of EU legislation. 
II. USE OF COMPARISON BETWEEN DIFFERENT LANGUAGE VERSIONS 
This section examines the use of comparison between language versions. I 
observe whether comparison is used to reconcile diverging language versions 
or to support an interpretation when no divergences are present. 
The search in the CVRIA database was done by selecting the following 
criteria: 
Period or date = 'Date of delivery' 
Period = 'from 01/01/2017 to 30/06/2017' 
Documents = Documents published in the ECR: Judgments; 
Documents not published in the ECR: Judgments 
Text = 'language versions' 
                                                 
8 On non-positivist perspectives in relation to meaning, see, for instance, Ralph 
Christensen and Michael Sokolowski, 'Wie normative ist Sprache? Der Richter 
zwischen Sprechautomat und Sprachgesetzgeber' in Ulrike Haß-Zumkehr (ed), 
Sprache und Recht (Walter de Gruyter 2002) 65.  
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Regarding the key term, I carried out many searches in previous studies using 
several key words. I concluded that the term 'language versions' extracts 
almost all instances of comparison between different language versions.9 In 
addition, in the present study I do not limit the search to any policy area.  
Fourteen judgements were obtained. The initial question that arose was 
whether all instances of comparison dealt with a divergence between 
different language versions. In ten cases (71%), comparison concerned some 
kind of divergence. However, there were four cases (29%) in which no 
divergence was present but the CJEU used comparison to confirm an 
interpretation, normally by stating that all language versions converged. 
Figure 1: Use of comparison 
If we consider the total number of judgements that the CJEU issued during 
the chosen period, these fourteen judgements represent only 3% of the cases. 
This figure is in line with the results obtained from larger and different 
                                                 
9 Christensen and Sokolowski (n 8); Fernando Prieto Ramos and Lucie Pacho 
Aljanati, 'Comparative Interpretation of Multilingual Law in International Courts: 
Patterns and Implications for Translation' in Fernando Prieto Ramos (ed), 
Institutional Translation for International Governance. Enhancing Quality in 
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periods, which means the period selected for this study is highly 
representative.10 
Moreover, looking at the type of proceedings, most cases (79%) are 
references for a preliminary ruling. These are the typical proceedings in 
which issues of linguistic divergences are treated. In these cases, the referring 
court has doubts as to the interpretation of a certain provision and the CJEU, 
in the framework of its competences (Art. 267 TFEU), has the final word in 
deciding how it must be interpreted.11 
 
Figure 2: Types of proceedings 
In addition, all cases were further classified into three different groups:12 
Group 1 – Hard cases: divergences treated as a problem of interpretation  
Group 2 – Soft cases: divergences not treated as a problem of interpretation 
Group 3: No divergence but comparison is used as confirmation 
                                                 
10 Pacho Aljanati (n 2); Prieto Ramos and Pacho Aljanati (n 9). 
11 Pacho Aljanati (n 2). 
12 I follow the classification used in previous studies: Pacho Aljanati (n 2) and Lucie 
Pacho Aljanati, 'Multilingual Interpretation by the CJEU in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice' in Joanna Jemielniak and Anne-Lise Kjær (eds), Language and 
Legal Interpretation in International Law (Oxford University Press 2018). 
21%
79%
Direct actions before the
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Cornelis Jaap Baaij mentions a similar classification: 'discrepancies posing 
interpretation problems', 'unproblematic discrepancies' and 'no 
discrepancies'.13 However, he does not provide details on these three 
categories and moves on to analyse the interpretive strategies, i.e. he analyses 
the method of interpretation that the CJEU applies. Joxerramon Bengoetxea 
differentiates between hard cases and clear cases. The term 'case' refers to a 
situation or a state of affairs, i.e. to the applicability of the sources to a certain 
situation in a given context.14 He explains that hard cases call for 
interpretation because of semantic or pragmatic features of the case at hand, 
for example because the meaning of the applicable norm may not be clear 
owing to polysemy, vagueness, generality and ambiguity of the terms used in 
the norm, or due to the open texture of legal language.15 In contrast, the 
justification of a decision in a clear case tends to be straightforward.16 'Clear 
case' refers to a situation in which 'the applicability of a legal rule or a set of 
legal rules to certain facts is clear and unproblematic'.17 
I call Group 1 'hard cases' because the CJEU deals with problematic 
divergences that require metalinguistic interpretation. However, for Group 
2 I use the term 'soft cases' and not 'clear cases' because the judgements 
present some divergences that are solved relatively easily. From the evidence 
found in the applied study, we cannot conclude that all requests for a 
preliminary ruling are hard cases.18 
I first analyse all instances of divergences quantitatively, without limiting the 
investigation to any languages in particular. This offers a global picture of 
how cases are distributed into the three groups and the methods of 
interpretation that the CJEU applies. The qualitative analysis focuses on an 
examination of the types of divergences, refining and exploring the linguistic 
                                                 
13 Cornelis Jaap W. Baaij, 'Fifty years of Multilingual Interpretation in the European 
Union' in Peter Tiersma and Lawbrence Solan (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Language and Law (Oxford University Press 2012) 219. 
14 Joxerramon Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice 
(Clarendon Press 1993) 183. 
15 Ibid 168. 
16 Ibid 173. 
17 Ibid 184. 
18 Suvi Sankari, European Court of Justice Legal Reasoning in Context (Europa Law 
Publishing 2013) 80, citing Bengoetxea (n 14). 
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and translation issues in greater detail. The focus is on Group 1 and Group 2. 
For this part, comparison is limited to English, French, German and Spanish, 
as these are my working languages.  
The following graph shows the distribution of the cases: 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of cases 
I also observe whether the divergence appears at an early stage (the referring 
court or one of the parties have already noted a divergence) or at a later stage 
(normally in cases where the referring court poses a question for a preliminary 
ruling and the Advocate General or the Court unveils the divergence at a later 
stage when trying to answer the question). The results show that in Group 1, 
in three cases the divergence was detected at an early stage, while in four cases 
the divergence appeared later. In Group 2, two of the cases present a 
divergence that appeared at an early stage and one case concerns a divergence 
that was noted at a later stage. The stage of discovering the divergence 
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Group 1 – Hard Cases: Divergences Treated as a Problem of Interpretation  
G1 – Divergences Detected at an Early Stage 
In the Sharda Europe case,19 the Court used the expression 'as the referring 
court states' in order to acknowledge that there was a divergence between the 
wording of the Spanish version and that of the other official language 
versions. The provision in question was the first subparagraph of Article 3(2) 
of Directive 2008/69 (emphasis added in italics): 
ES 2. Como excepción a lo establecido en el apartado 1, todo producto 
fitosanitario autorizado que contenga una de las sustancias activas 
enumeradas en el anexo como única sustancia activa, o junto con 
otras sustancias activas incluidas todas ellas en el anexo I de la 
Directiva 91/414/CEE, será objeto de una nueva evaluación, a más 
tardar, el 31 de diciembre de 2008, por parte de los Estados miembros 
de acuerdo con los principios uniformes previstos en el anexo VI 
de la citada Directiva, sobre la base de una documentación que 
reúna los requisitos establecidos en su anexo III y que tenga en 
cuenta la parte B de la entrada en su anexo I por lo que respecta a 
las sustancias activas enumeradas en el anexo. 
DE (2) Abweichend von Absatz 1 unterziehen die Mitgliedstaaten 
jedes zugelassene Pflanzenschutzmittel, das einen der im Anhang 
genannten Wirkstoffe entweder als einzigen Wirkstoff oder als 
einen von mehreren Wirkstoffen enthält, die sämtlich bis spätestens 
31. Dezember 2008 in Anhang I der Richtlinie 91/414/EWG 
aufgeführt waren, einer Neubewertung nach den einheitlichen 
Grundsätzen gemäß Anhang VI der Richtlinie 91/414/EWG. Sie 
stützen sich dabei auf Unterlagen, die den Anforderungen des 
Anhangs III dieser Richtlinie genügen, und berücksichtigen den 
Eintrag in Anhang I Teil B der genannten Richtlinie in Bezug auf 
die im Anhang genannten Wirkstoffe. 
EN 2. By way of derogation from paragraph 1, for each authorised plant 
protection product containing one of the active substances listed 
                                                 
19 Case C-293/16 Sharda Europe BVBA v Administración del Estado and Syngenta Agro, 
SA EU:C:2017:430. 
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in the Annex as either the only active substance or as one of several 
active substances all of which were listed in Annex I to Directive 
91/414/EEC by 31 December 2008 at the latest, Member States shall re-
evaluate the product in accordance with the uniform principles 
provided for in Annex VI to Directive 91/414/EEC, on the basis of 
a dossier satisfying the requirements of Annex III to that Directive 
and taking into account part B of the entry in Annex I to that 
Directive concerning the active substances listed in the Annex. 
FR 2. Par dérogation au paragraphe 1, tout produit 
phytopharmaceutique autorisé contenant l'une des substances 
actives mentionnées dans l'annexe, en tant que substance active 
unique ou associée à d'autres substances actives, toutes inscrites à 
l'annexe I de la directive 91/414/CEE au plus tard le 31 décembre 2008, 
fait l'objet d'une réévaluation par les États membres, 
conformément aux principes uniformes prévus à l'annexe VI de 
ladite directive, sur la base d'un dossier satisfaisant aux conditions 
de son annexe III et tenant compte de la partie B de l'inscription à 
son annexe I concernant les substances actives mentionnées dans 
l'annexe. 
 
The divergence is clear because in the Spanish version the date of 31 
December 2008 constitutes the deadline by which the Member States must 
carry out a re-evaluation. In contrast, in the German, English and French 
versions this date refers to the listing of the active substances contained in 
the authorised plant protection product that is to be re-evaluated by the 
Member States. The Court seemed to compare other language versions as 
well: 'The same is true, inter alia, of the Greek, Italian and Dutch versions of 
that provision'.20 
The Court explained that the Spanish version was the one that differed from 
the rest: 'More specifically, the wording of all those language versions, with 
the exception of the Spanish version [...]'. According to the Court, this 
provision indicates that 'the plant protection product concerned must be re-
evaluated if all the active substances composing it, together with those listed 
                                                 
20 Sharda Europe (n 19) para 19. 
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in the Annex to Directive 2008/69, had been listed in Annex I to Directive 
91/414 by 31 December 2008 at the latest'.21 
Immediately after that, the Court invoked the idea that all versions 
constitute the same legal instrument and must be read jointly: 'the wording 
used in one language version of a provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole 
basis for the interpretation of that provision or be given priority over the 
other language versions in that regard'.22 The Court then moved on to a 
teleological interpretation by referring to the 'general scheme and purpose of 
the rules'.23 After examining the context and the purpose of the Directive,24 
the Court confirmed that the date of 31 December 2008 corresponds to 'the 
deadline by which all the active substances contained in that plant protection 
product, other than those listed in the Annex to Directive 2008/69, must 
have been included on the list in Annex I to Directive 91/414'.25 Finally, in this 
case there was no Opinion of the Advocate General that could provide any 
other information.26 
The second case that I analyse in this group is Pinckernelle.27 From a reading 
of the judgement of the Court, it seems that the divergence appeared later, 
because no mention is made as to who detected the problem. However, after 
examining the Opinion of the Advocate General I realised that the 
divergence was in fact spotted earlier: 'The written observations of the City 
of Hamburg, Germany, Italy and the Commission all feature discussion of 
                                                 
21 Sharda Europe (n 19) para 20. 
22 Ibid para 21. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid paras 22-24. 
25 Ibid para 25. 
26 Not all cases have an Opinion of the Advocate General. 
27 Case C-535/15 Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg v Jost Pinckernelle EU:C:2017:315. 
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the various language versions of Article 5 of the REACH Regulation28 with 
respect to the meaning of 'placed on the market'.29  
The Commission argued that there were eight language versions (Danish, 
Latvian, Hungarian, Romanian, Slovakian, Swedish, Slovenian, and Czech 
versions) in which the words 'in the Community' in Article 5 of the REACH 
Regulation applied both to manufacture and to placing on the market. Three 
language versions (Spanish, Lithuanian and German) were ambiguous, and 
ten (Bulgarian, Estonian, Finnish, Greek, Italian, Dutch, Polish, Portuguese, 
French and English) appeared to attach the territorial limitation 'in the 
Community' only to manufacture.30  
ES Sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en los artículos 6, 7, 21 y 23, no se 
fabricarán en la Comunidad ni se comercializarán sustancias, como 
tales o en forma de preparados o contenidas en artículos, a menos 
que se hayan registrado de conformidad con las disposiciones 
pertinentes del presente título que así lo exijan. 
DE Vorbehaltlich der Artikel 6, 7, 21 und 23 dürfen Stoffe als solche, in 
Gemischen oder in Erzeugnissen nur dann in der Gemeinschaft 
hergestellt oder in Verkehr gebracht werden, wenn sie nach den 
einschlägigen Bestimmungen dieses Titels, soweit vorgeschrieben, 
registriert wurden. 
EN Subject to Articles 6, 7, 21 and 23, substances on their own, in 
preparations or in articles shall not be manufactured in the 
Community or placed on the market unless they have been 
registered in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Title 
where this is required. 
                                                 
28 Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency, 
amending Directive 1999/45/EC and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) 793/93 
and Commission Regulation (EC) 1488/94 as well as Council Directive 76/769/EEC 
and Commission Directives 91/155/EEC, 93/67/EEC, 93/105/EC and 2000/21/EC 
(Text with EEA relevance) [2006] OJ L 396. 
29 Ibid, EU:C:2016:996, Opinion of AG Tanchev, para 35. 
30 Pinckernelle (n 27) para 38. 
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FR Sous réserve des articles 6, 7, 21 et 23, des substances telles quelles 
ou contenues dans des préparations ou des articles ne sont pas 
fabriquées dans la Communauté ou mises sur le marché si elles n'ont 
pas été enregistrées conformément aux dispositions pertinentes 
du présent titre, lorsque cela est exigé. 
 
A more detailed analysis of the four languages I compare in this study shows 
that the Spanish and German versions are ambiguous (it is not clear whether 
'in the Community' refers to both the manufacture and the placing in the 
market) whereas in the English and French versions the expression 'in the 
Community' is explicitly linked to the manufacture of substances. 
It is interesting that before engaging in comparison the Court sustained that 
'for the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law it is necessary to 
consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the 
objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part'.31 Then it compared and 
remarked the diverging interpretations. After that, it continued with an 
examination of the context.32 After a careful analysis, the Court concluded 
that the expression 'placing on the market' relates to the internal market of 
the EU. Therefore, the expression 'in the Community' is modifying both the 
manufacture and placing on the market. 
In the Al Chodor case,33 the referring court pointed out that the language 
versions of Article 2(n) of theDublin III Regulation34 diverged (emphasis 
added): 
  
                                                 
31 Pinckernelle (n 27) para 31. 
32 Ibid (n 26) paras 34-43. 
33 Case C-528/15 Policie ČR, Krajské ředitelství policie Ústeckého kraje, odbor cizinecké 
policie v Salah Al Chodor and Others EU:C:2017:213. 
34 Regulation (EU) 604/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member States 
responsible for examining an application for international protection lodges in one 
of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person [2013] OJ L 
180/31. 
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ES «riesgo de fuga»: la existencia de razones basadas en criterios 
objetivos definidos por ley que, en un caso concreto, permitan 
pensar que un solicitante, un nacional de un tercer país o un 
apátrida sujeto a un procedimiento de traslado pueda fugarse. 
DE „Fluchtgefahr' das Vorliegen von Gründen im Einzelfall, die auf 
objektiven gesetzlich festgelegten Kriterien beruhen und zu der 
Annahme Anlass geben, dass sich ein Antragsteller, ein 
Drittstaatsangehöriger oder Staatenloser, gegen den ein 
Überstellungsverfahren läuft, diesem Verfahren möglicherweise 
durch Flucht entziehen könnte. 
EN 'risk of absconding' means the existence of reasons in an 
individual case, which are based on objective criteria defined by 
law, to believe that an applicant or a third country national or a 
stateless person who is subject to a transfer procedure may 
abscond. 
FR «risque de fuite», dans un cas individuel, l'existence de raisons, 
fondées sur des critères objectifs définis par la loi, de craindre la 
fuite d'un demandeur, un ressortissant de pays tiers ou un 
apatride qui fait l'objet d'une procédure de transfert. 
 
From a comparison of these versions, we can observe that the German 
language version of the provision refers to objective criteria 'laid down in 
legislation'. Other language versions refer to criteria defined 'by law' (in the 
general sense). In addition, the referring court noted that the European 
Court of Human Rights interprets the term 'law' broadly.35 According to the 
Czech court, 'that term is not limited solely to legislation, but also includes 
other sources of law'.36  
                                                 
35 Also see the Opinion of the AG who sustains the concept of 'law' as referred to in 
the Regulation has an independent meaning distinct from that of the concept of 
'law' as referred to in the ECHR. Salah Al Chodor (n 33) Opinion of AG 
Saugmandsgaard Øe, para 42. 
36 Salah Al Chodor (n 33) para 21. 
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When the Court started answering the question posed by the referring court, 
it claimed that a textual interpretation was not helpful in that case:  
 [...] a purely textual analysis of the notion of 'defined by law' cannot 
determine whether case-law or a consistent administrative practice are 
capable of coming within that concept. In the different language versions of 
that regulation, the term equivalent to the term 'loi (legislation)' has a 
different scope.37 
The Court added that the wording used in some versions is similar to the 
concept of droit (law in the general sense), which can have a wider scope than 
loi (legislation). In addition, other language versions have a more restrictive 
scope.38 The difference in scope is significant. The conclusion was that the 
objective criteria required implementation in the national law of each 
Member State.39 Linguistic interpretation was clearly not enough in this case 
and the Court had to examine the purpose and general scheme of the rules.40 
G1 – Divergences Detected at a Later Stage 
In the ERGO Poist'ovňa case,41 a divergence appeared regarding the Czech, 
Latvian and Slovak language versions. As I do not command any of 
these languages, I will limit myself to mentioning the arguments of the 
Court. It explained that in most of the language versions the provision 
in question provided that 'the right to commission can be 
extinguished only 'if and to the extent that' it is established that the 
contract between the third party and the principal will not be 
executed'.42 However, the Czech, Latvian and Slovak language 
versions of the provision did not contain wording which could be 
translated as 'to the extent that'.43  
                                                 
37 Salah Al Chodor (n 33) para 31. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid para 28 
40 Ibid para 32. 
41 Case C-48/16 ERGO Poist'ovňa, a.s. v Alžbeta Barlíková EU:C:2017:377. 
42 ERGO Poist'ovňa (n 41) para 34. 
43 The AG enters into a bit more detail and compares the expressions in a footnote: 
See, for example, the Spanish ('en la medida'), Danish ('i det omfang'), German 
('soweit'), Estonian ('ulatuses'), French ('dans la mesure où'), Italian ('nella misura 
in cui'), Lithuanian ('tik tiek, kiek'), Maltese ('sal-limiti li'), Dutch ('voor zover'), 
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The Court resorted to metalinguistic criteria of interpretation. It recalled 
that 'provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the 
light of the versions existing in all the languages of the European Union'.44 
Here the Court makes clear that all languages constitute the same legal 
instrument. It then invoked the purpose and general scheme: 
Where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU 
legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to 
the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgment 
of 1 March 2016, Alo and Osso, C-443/14 and C-444/14, EU:C:2016:127, 
paragraph 27).45 
In the Popescu case,46 the Court dealt with the concept of 'entitlement to 
drive granted before 19 January 2013'. As the divergence concerned the 
Romanian version, which I do not command, I will not enter into much 
detail. The provision in question used the expression drept de conducere 
acordat, including the word drept which normally refers to the right itself, not 
the document attesting a right granted, and the word acordat which literally 
means 'accorded' or 'granted', and may refer both to a right and to a document 
attesting that right.47 
In addition, both the Advocate General and the Court observed that a literal 
interpretation of the expression droit de conduire délivré in the French version 
could suggest that the wording of the said provision implies that 'only express 
entitlements to drive deriving from an instrument formally issued, generally 
in the form of an individual administrative act, before 19 January 2013 would 
not be affected, in accordance with that provision, by the requirements of 
that directive'.48 
In the face of the differences between various language versions, the Court 
recalled that 'the wording used in one language version of a provision of EU 
                                                 
Polish ('o ile'), Portuguese ('na medida em que'), and Romanian ('în măsura în care') 
language versions. ERGO Poist'ovňa (n 38) Opinion of AG Szpunar, para 26. 
44 ERGO Poist'ovňa (n 41) para 37. 
45 Ibid para 37. 
46 Case C-632/15 Costin Popescu v Guvernul României and Others EU:C:2017:303.  
47 Ibid para 32. 
48 Popescu (n 46) para 33. 
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law cannot serve as the sole basis for the interpretation',49 in this way 
confirming the impossibility of relying on a single language version. 
'Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied uniformly in the light 
of the versions existing in all EU languages'.50 The Court used the determiner 
'all', which would imply that all official languages are deemed to be compared. 
Immediately after that, it stated that 'where there is divergence between the 
various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question 
must be interpreted by reference to the general scheme and purpose of the 
rules of which it forms part'.51 
From a reading of the judgement it is not possible to know how many 
languages were in fact compared. The Court used the expression 'differences 
between various language versions' without specifying which ones.52 The 
Advocate General delved a bit more into the comparison. He commented on 
the wording in the French version and observed that 'an equivalent approach 
could be apparent from other language versions of that provision', adding in 
the footnote: 'See, inter alia, the Danish, German, Croatian, Portuguese and 
Slovak versions'.53 
After examining the general scheme and the purpose of the Directive,54 the 
Court concluded that following a schematic and a teleological interpretation, 
'Article 13(2) of the directive relates only to the holding of driving licences and 
official documents equivalent to them which expressly authorise their 
holders to drive'.55 Therefore, the objectives pursued by the directive and also 
the context of Article 13 led to an interpretation contrary to that proposed by 
Mr. Popescu.56  
                                                 
49 Ibid para 35. 
50 Popescu (n 46). 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid para 34. 
53 Ibid, Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, para 42. 
54 Ibid para 36-45. 
55 Ibid para 46. 
56 Ibid, Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, para 40. 
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Moreover, in GE Healthcare case,57 there was a problem of interpretation 
regarding Article 160 of Regulation No. 2454/93 (emphasis added): 
ES Cuando el comprador pague un canon o un derecho de licencia a 
un tercero, las condiciones mencionadas en el apartado 2 del 
artículo 157 sólo se considerarán cumplidas si el vendedor, o una 
persona vinculada al mismo, pide al comprador que 
DE Zahlt der Käufer eine Lizenzgebühr an einen Dritten, so gelten 
die Voraussetzungen des Artikels 157 Absatz 2 nur dann als 
erfüllt, wenn der Verkäufer oder eine mit diesem verbundene Person 
die Zahlung an diese dritte Person vom Käufer verlangt. 
EN When the buyer pays royalties or licence fees to a third party, the 
conditions provided for in Article 157 (2) shall not be considered as 
met unless the seller or a person related to him requires the buyer to 
make that payment. 
FR Lorsque l'acheteur verse une redevance ou un droit de licence à un 
tiers, les conditions visées à l'article 157 paragraphe 2 ne sont 
considérées comme remplies que si le vendeur ou une personne qui 
lui est liée requiert de l'acheteur d'effectuer ce paiement. 
 
As the Advocate General explained in his Opinion, the German language 
version of Article 160 seems to refer to 'a third party separate from both the 
seller and the person related to the seller'.58 From a comparative reading it can 
be seen that none of the other language versions contains a second reference 
to the 'third party' to whom royalties or licence fees are paid.59 
The referring court sought to know 'whether the condition laid down in 
Article 160 of Regulation No. 2454/93 is satisfied in a situation where the 
'third party' to whom the royalty or licence fee is payable and the 'person 
related' to the seller are the same person'.60 In that regard, the applicant in 
the main proceedings, GE Healthcare, relied essentially on the German 
                                                 
57 Case C-173/15 GE Healthcare GmbH v Hauptzollamt Düsseldorf EU:C:2017:195. 
58 Ibid EU:C:2016:621, Opinion of AG Mengozzi, para 61. 
59 GE Healthcare GmbH (n 57) para 66. 
60 Ibid para 63. 
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language version and claimed that 'the person requiring payment of the 
royalty or licence fee and the third party to whom the royalty or licence fee is 
payable cannot be identical'.61 
In order to answer the question, the Court first reminded that the wording in 
one language version cannot constitute the only basis for interpretation 
because 'such an approach would be incompatible with the requirement that 
EU law be applied uniformly'.62 In addition, it emphasised that 'where there 
is a divergence between the various language versions', it is necessary to 
examine the general scheme and the purpose of the rules. With this reasoning 
the Court seems to confirm that when we are faced with divergences between 
language versions, metalinguistic criteria of interpretation are required.  
In the Opinion, the Advocate General sustained that the main problem of 
interpretation was not the fact that the German version added the expression 
'third party': 
This is not, however, the deciding factor. The obligation on the buyer to 
make 'that payment' obviously refers to the payment of royalties or licence 
fees which the buyer is required to make to the 'third party'. 
Both the Advocate General and the Court explained that what mattered in 
fact was not so much 'the person to whom the payment of royalties or licence 
fees is made'.63 The important point was 'whether or not the buyer of the 
imported goods is able to acquire them from the seller without paying 
royalties or licence fees'.64 The Court concluded that it was 'for the national 
court to ascertain whether that is the position in the main proceedings'.65 
Finally, in the Vilkas case,66 there was a certain divergence between the 
various language versions of Article 23(3) of the Framework Decision as 
regards the conditions for applying the rule set out in the first sentence of 
that provision. 
                                                 
61 Ibid para 64. 
62 GE Healthcare GmbH (n 57) para 65. 
63 Ibid EU:C:2016:621, Opinion of AG Mengozzi, para 66. 
64 Ibid. 
65 GE Healthcare GmbH (n 57) para 69. 
66 Case C-640/15 Minister for Justice and Equality v Tomas Vilkas EU:C:2017:39. 
24 European Journal of Legal Studies  {Special Issue 
ES 3. Cuando cualquier circunstancia ajena al control de alguno de los 
Estados miembros afectados impida entregar a la 
DE (3) Ist die Übergabe der gesuchten Person innerhalb der in Absatz 
2 genannten Frist aufgrund von Umständen, die sich dem Einfluss 
der Mitgliedstaaten entziehen, unmöglich, setzen sich die 
vollstreckende und die ausstellende Justizbehörde unverzüglich 
miteinander in Verbindung und vereinbaren ein neues 
Übergabedatum. In diesem Fall erfolgt die Übergabe binnen zehn 
Tagen nach dem vereinbarten neuen Termin. 
EN 3. If the surrender of the requested person within the period laid 
down in paragraph 2 is prevented by circumstances beyond the control 
of any of the Member States, the executing and issuing judicial 
authorities shall immediately contact each other and agree on a 
new surrender date. In that event, the surrender shall take place 
within 10 days of the new date thus agreed. 
FR 3. Si la remise de la personne recherchée, dans le délai prévu au 
paragraphe 2, s'avère impossible en vertu d'un cas de force majeure 
dans l'un ou l'autre des États membres, l'autorité judiciaire 
d'exécution et l'autorité judiciaire d'émission prennent 
immédiatement contact l'une avec l'autre et conviennent d'une 
nouvelle date de remise. Dans ce cas, la remise a lieu dans les dix 
jours suivant la nouvelle date convenue. 
 
The Court observed that the Greek, French, Italian, Portuguese, Romanian 
and Finnish versions of that provision made the application of the rule 
conditional on the impossibility to carry out the surrender by reason of a case 
of force majeure in one of the Member States concerned. However, other 
language versions of the same provision, such as the Spanish, Czech, Danish, 
German, Greek, English, Dutch, Polish, Slovak and Swedish versions, 
referred instead to it not being possible to carry out the surrender on account 
of circumstances beyond the control of the Member States concerned.67 
                                                 
67 Vilkas (n 66) para 46. 
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The Court recalled the need for uniform interpretation and the impossibility 
to consider the text in isolation: 
The need for a uniform interpretation of a provision of EU law makes it 
impossible for the text of a provision to be considered, in case of doubt, in 
isolation but requires, on the contrary, that it should be interpreted on the 
basis of both the actual intention of the legislature and the objective pursued 
by the latter, in the light, in particular, of the versions drawn up in all 
languages.68 
Here the Court highlighted the need to consider 'the actual intention of the 
legislature', taking into account all language versions. After analysing the 
origin of the provision in question,69 the Court concluded that expression 
used in Article 11(3) referred to a situation which could not have been foreseen 
and could not have been prevented, as the concept of force majeure is usually 
understood.70 
Group 2 – Soft Cases: Divergences Not Treated as a Problem of Interpretation 
G2 – Divergences Detected at an Early Stage 
In the Khorassani case,71 the referring court detected some divergence and the 
Court acknowledged it but did not treat it as a problem of interpretation. 
The provision in question is Section A of Annex I to Directive 2004/39 
(emphasis added): 
ES Recepción y transmisión de órdenes de clientes en relación con uno 
o más instrumentos financieros. 
DE Annahme und Übermittlung von Aufträgen, die ein oder mehrere 
Finanzinstrument(e) zum Gegenstand haben. 
ENF Reception and transmission of orders in relation to one or more 
financial instruments. 
                                                 
68 Vilkas (n 66) para 47. 
69 Ibid paras 48-51. 
70 Ibid para 51-52. 
71 Case C-678/15 Mohammad Zadeh Khorassani v Kathrin Pflanz EU:C:2017:451. 
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FR Réception et transmission d'ordres portant sur un ou plusieurs 
instruments financiers. 
 
The Court explained that depending on the language version, the terms 'in 
relation to' may suggest a more or less direct link between the orders and the 
financial instrument(s).72 
The Court used a concessive clause to clarify the question by comparing the 
different language versions:  
[...] 'although the referring court observes a certain divergence between the 
different language versions [...] it should be noted that the term 'order' […] 
remains the same in the language versions cited by the referring court, being 
the German-, Spanish-, English- and French-language versions'. [...]73  
The Court contended that the term 'order' remained the same in the 
language versions cited by the referring court, being the German, Spanish, 
English and French language versions.74 It concluded that the words 'in 
relation to one or more financial instruments' merely served to specify which 
type of order was being referred to, that is to say, the orders relating to the 
purchase or the sale of such financial instruments.75 
In the NEW WAVE CZ case,76 it was also the referring court that noted some 
differences between the various language versions of Directive 2004/48. The 
Czech, English and French versions of the directive used respectively the 
words 'in connection with proceedings' (v souvislosti s řízením), 'in the context 
of proceedings', and 'within the framework of proceedings' (dans le cadre d'une 
action). According to that Court, the French version introduced a closer 
connection between the proceedings and the application for information.77 
The Court removed the divergence by comparing the different language 
versions:  
                                                 
72 Khorassani (n 71) para 27. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid para 28. 
76 Case C-427/15 NEW WAVE CZ, a.s. v ALLTOYS, spol. s r. o. EU:C:2017:18. 
77 Ibid para 16. 
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[...] as the referring court observes, some language versions [...] do indeed use 
expressions which could be interpreted as being of a narrower scope than 
those used in other language versions [...]. The fact remains, however, [...] 
that it does not follow from any of those language versions that [...]. 
In order to confirm its interpretation, the Court also analysed the wording of 
Article 8(1) of Directive 2004/4878 and the objective of the Directive.79 
G2 – Divergences Detected at a Later Stage 
Finally, in the Onix Asigurări case,80 the Court recognised that there was some 
divergence between the language versions of Article 40(6) of Directive 92/49, 
but that the linguistic divergence was not the main problem of interpretation. 
ES 6. Los apartados 3, 4 y 5 no afectarán a la facultad de los Estados 
miembros interesados de adoptar, en casos de urgencia, las 
medidas apropiadas para prevenir las irregularidades cometidas en su 
territorio. Ello implica la posibilidad de impedir que una empresa de 
seguros siga celebrando nuevos contratos de seguros en su 
territorio. 
DE (6) Die Absätze 3, 4 und 5 berühren nicht die Befugnis der 
Mitgliedstaaten, in dringenden Fällen geeignete Maßnahmen zu 
ergreifen, um Unregelmässigkeiten in ihrem Staatsgebiet zu 
verhindern oder zu ahnden. Dies schließt die Möglichkeit ein, ein 
Versicherungsunternehmen zu hindern, weitere neue 
Versicherungsverträge in ihrem Staatsgebiet abzuschließen. 
EN 6. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 shall not affect the emergency power of the 
Member States concerned to take appropriate measures to 
prevent irregularities within their territories. This shall include the 
possibility of preventing insurance undertakings from continuing 
to conclude new insurance contracts within their territories. 
FR 6. Les paragraphes 3, 4 et 5 n'affectent pas le pouvoir des États 
membres concernés de prendre, en cas d'urgence, des mesures 
                                                 
78 NEW WAVE CZ (n 76) para 22. 
79 Ibid para 23. 
80 Case C-559/15 Onix Asigurări SA v Istituto per la Vigilanza Sulle Assicurazioni 
(IVASS) EU:C:2017:316. 
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appropriées pour prévenir les irrégularités commises sur leur 
territoire. Ceci comporte la possibilité d'empêcher une entreprise 
d'assurance de continuer à conclure de nouveaux contrats 
d'assurance sur leur territoire. 
 
The Court pointed out that 'certain language versions of that provision, in 
particular those in Spanish and French, refer to irregularities 'committed' in 
the territory of the Member State concerned, which may indicate that this 
provision applies only where irregular acts have already been carried out'.81 
Then the Court invoked the need for uniform interpretation of EU 
regulations and contended that 'where there are doubts', the text of a 
provision cannot be 'considered in isolation but requires, on the contrary, 
that it should be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing 
in the other official languages'.82 Here the Court used the 'criterion of doubt', 
as it has been designated by Mattias Derlén.83 
From a comparative reading of the Article, the Court concluded that 'all the 
language versions use the verb 'to prevent' or a similar word to describe the 
subject matter of the measures which may be adopted'. As a consequence, the 
provision refers to the adoption of measures to prevent irregularities in the 
future.84 It does not make sense to interpret it as irregular acts that have 
already been carried out.85 
The Court reconciled the diverging versions by comparing them. However, 
in order to answer the question posed by the referring court it highlighted 
that 'the wording of Article 40(6) of Directive 92/49, considered in isolation, 
                                                 
81 Onix Asigurări (n 80) para 38. 
82 Ibid para 39. 
83 Mattias Derlén, Multilingual Interpretation of European Union Law (Kluwer Law 
International 2009) 32; Mattias Derlén, 'In Defence of (Limited) Multilingualism: 
Problems and Possibilities of the Multilingual Interpretation of European Union 
Law in National Courts' in Anne-Lise Kjær, Silvia Adamo (eds), Linguistic Diversity 
and European Democracy (Ashgate 2011) 145. 
84 Onix Asigurări (n 80) para 40. 
85 In the Opinion, the AG did not compare so it is not possible to provide any further 
insight into the matter. 
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does not enable an answer to be given to the question referred. In those 
circumstances, it is necessary to consider the context in which that provision 
occurs, and the objectives pursued by that directive'.86 
Group 3: No Divergence but Comparison is Used as Confirmation 
In this group I have analysed three cases of direct actions before the General 
Court and one case of a reference for a preliminary ruling. The Court used 
comparison to confirm an interpretation, usually by stating that all language 
versions converged in meaning. 
In Ball Beverage Packaging Europe v EUIPO – Crown Hellas Can (Canettes),87 it 
used the following expression: 'that finding follows also from Article [...], 
which in all the language versions, refers to [...]'. In Deza v ECHA,88 the Court 
used comparison to support an interpretation, although it did not state that 
all language versions converged.89 In Hernández Zamora v EUIPO - Rosen 
Tantau (Paloma),90 the Spanish version, which in that case was the authentic 
version,91 was compared with the other versions to confirm an interpretation: 
'the Spanish version is also consistent with the language versions of the 
wording of the goods covered by the earlier mark, other than the English 
version'.92 In Rosneft,93 the Court observed that 'none of the language versions 
of Article [...] expressly refers to the 'processing of payments'. That being the 
                                                 
86 Onix Asigurări (n 80) para 41. 
87 Case T-9/15 Ball Beverage Packaging Europe Ltd v European Union Intellectual Property 
Office EU:T:2017:386. 
88 Case T-115/15 Deza, a.s. v European Chemicals Agency EU:T:2017:329. 
89 Ibid and EU:T:2017:329, para 173. 
90 Case T-369/15 Hernández Zamora, SA v European Union Intellectual Property Office 
EU:T:2017:106. 
91 The Court explained as follows: 'Article 120(3) of Regulation No 207/2009 provides 
that 'in cases of doubt, the text in the language of [EUIPO] in which the application 
for the EU trade mark was filed shall be authentic'. In the present case, it is 
therefore the Spanish version of the wording of the goods covered by the earlier 
mark that is authentic'. Case T-369/15 Hernández Zamora, SA v European Union 
Intellectual Property Office EU:T:2017:106, para 40. 
92 Zamora (n 90). 
93 Case C-72/15 PJSC Rosneft Oil Company v Her Majesty's Treasury and Others 
EU:C:2017:236. 
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case, reference must be made to the general structure and objectives of that 
regulation'. 
III. LEGAL CERTAINTY AND METHODS OF INTERPRETATION  
This section explores the issues of legal certainty in relation to 
multilingualism. One can think legal certainty is incompatible with 
multilingualism, but I sustain both concepts can be balanced. I then mention 
different methods of interpretation that the CJEU applies and I explain my 
own classification of interpretive techniques to solve divergences.  
1. A Note on Legal Certainty 
Law complies with the function of legal certainty when those to whom legal 
norms are addressed can be informed as to where they stand, so that they can 
act with full knowledge of the consequences of their behaviour.94 Legal 
certainty requires that legal norms be clear (foreseeable) and accessible.95  
On the one hand, multilingualism allows access to EU legislation in all official 
languages, thus ensuring a central aspect of legal certainty. The concrete task 
of making multilingual legislation is done thanks to translation. Without 
translation there would be no EU legislation. On the other hand, the need to 
compare different language versions can be seen as the impossibility to rely 
on a single language version. However, systematic comparison between the 
twenty-four language versions is very difficult and this applied study has 
shown that even the CJEU does not use comparison on a routine basis. As a 
consequence, one could argue that the impossibility to rely on a single 
language version is detrimental to legal certainty. Nevertheless, the 
requirement to compare helps to balance the fact that EU legislation is 
multilingual, and divergences between different language versions are 
sometimes inevitable. As with many principles in law, in some situations 
there will be conflicting principles and it is not a question of eliminating one 
or the other; it is rather a matter of finding a balance between them. This 
following graph summarises this idea: 
                                                 
94 Josep Joan Moreso and Josep Maria Vilajosana, Introducción a la teoría del derecho 
(Marcial Pons 2004). 
95 Pacho Aljanati (n 2) 103. 
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Figure 4: Balancing legal certainty and multilingualism 
 
Susan Šarčević remarked that 'whether and to what extent the authentic texts 
of EU legislation actually have the same meaning is a matter of 
interpretation'.96 The CJEU is responsible for interpreting EU legislation 
(Art. 267 TFEU) based on the premise that no language version prevails over 
the others and it is necessary to interpret them uniformly.97 
In this applied study there are three cases that touch upon the question of 
legal certainty most directly. In Popescu, the applicant relied on the Romanian 
language version for its interpretation, but the Court then arrived at a 
conclusion contrary to that proposed by Popescu. In GE Healthcare, the 
applicant relied on the German language version, which turned out to be the 
only version that differed from the rest. These parties learned that their 
arguments could not be based only on the wording in their national language. 
                                                 
96 Susan Šarčević, 'Multilingual Lawmaking and Legal (Un)Certainty in the European 
Union'(2013) 3(1) International Journal of Law, Language and Discourse 1. 
97 See Case 19/67 Van der Vecht EU:C:1967:49, CILFT case  (n 2) and Case 30/77 Regina 
v Bouchereau EU:C:1977:172, para 14. 
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The Sharda Europe case is more complex and it illustrates the idea of balance 
exposed above. First it is necessary to make a reconstruction of the facts. 
1. On 14 January 2009, Sharda submitted an application for re-
evaluation of the authorisation it had for the placing on the market 
of a plant protection product which contained one of the active 
substances listed in the Annex to that directive. That application 
was granted by the competent national authorities. 
2. Syngenta brought an administrative action seeking to have the 
authorisation issued for the plant protection product withdrawn. 
The administrative action was brought before the Secretaría 
General Técnica del Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, Rural y 
Marino (Technical General Secretariat of the Ministry for 
Environmental, Rural and Marine Affairs, Spain). Syngenta alleged 
that the application for re-evaluation of that product had been 
submitted after 31 December 2008. It claimed that this date 
constituted the deadline for the submission of such an application 
for re-evaluation under Article 3(2) of Directive 2008/69. The 
Technical General Secretariat dismissed the action. 
3. Syngenta brought an appeal against that decision before the 
Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid (High Court of Justice, 
Madrid, Spain). This High Court annulled the re-evaluation 
procedure on the ground that the application for re-evaluation had 
been submitted after the expiry of the deadline set in Article 3(2) 
of Directive 2008/69. 
4.  Sharda brought an appeal against that judgement before the 
Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court, Spain). It claimed that this 
date did not preclude the submission of applications for re-
evaluation after 31 December 2008. 
5.  The Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court) was not certain whether 
this date constituted a deadline for carrying out the re-evaluation 
or for listing the active substances. It decided to stay the 
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proceedings and pose the question to the CJEU for a preliminary 
ruling. 
6.  The CJEU finally stated that this date corresponded to the 
deadline by which all the active substances contained in that plant 
protection product had to be included on the list in Annex I to 
Directive 91/414. 
 
Thanks to comparison between different language versions it was possible to 
bring to light that Sharda's claim was right. The Tribunal Superior de Justicia 
annulled the re-evaluation procedure but this was not the right 
interpretation. If it had compared the Spanish version with other versions 
the divergence would have come to light earlier. This case is a good example 
of how comparison can guarantee uniform application of EU law. 
2. Methods of Interpretation 
In the literature, it is generally agreed that there are three main methods that 
the CJEU applies: literal, systematic and teleological.98 Authors sometimes 
use different terminology, but the essence of the methods is practically the 
same. Some legal scholars add two more methods: historical and comparative 
law interpretations. For example, Hans Kutscher99 refers to literal 
interpretation, schematic interpretation, teleological interpretation, 
historical interpretation and comparative law interpretation. Similarly, 
                                                 
98 See, for instance, Anna Bredimas, Methods of Interpretation and Community Law 
(North-Holland 1978); Bengoetxea (n 13); Joxerramon Bengoetxea, Neil 
MacCormick and Leonor Moral Soriano, 'Integration and Integrity in the Legal 
Reasoning of the European Court of Justice' in Gráinne de Búrca and Joseph H. H. 
Weiler (eds), The European Court of Justice (Oxford University Press 2001); Giulio 
Itzcovich, 'The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of 
Justice' (2009) 10(5) German Law Journal 534; Elina Paunio, Legal certainty in 
multilingual EU law: language, discourse and reasoning at the European Court of Justice 
(Ashgate 2013); Suvi Sankari, European Court of Justice Legal Reasoning in Context 
(Europa Law Publishing 2013). 
99 Hans Kutscher, Methods of interpretation as seen by a judge at the Court of Justice 
(Luxembourg 1976). 
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Neville Brown and Francis G. Jacobs100 as well as Albertina Albors Llorens101 
talk about literal interpretation, contextual interpretation, teleological 
interpretation, historical interpretation and comparative law as aids to 
interpretation. Isabel Schübel-Pfister102 uses the following categories: 
Wortlautauslegung, systematische Auslegung, teleologische Auslegung, historische 
Auslegung, and Rechtsvergleichende Auslegung.103  
When dealing with divergences between various language versions, most 
authors have divided the methods into two groups: interpretation that uses 
linguistic arguments and interpretation that uses arguments that go beyond 
the linguistic level. The terminology used in the literature also varies. For 
example, Pierre Pescatore104 divides the criteria into solution réductrice and 
solution métalinguistique,105 and Baaij refers to the literal approach and the 
teleological approach.106 Derlén,107 makes a more detailed analysis of the 
methods and establishes three categories: classical reconciliation, 
reconciliation and examination of the purpose, and radical teleological 
method.  
                                                 
100 L. Neville Brown, Francis G. Jacobs, The Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(3rd ed.) (Sweet & Maxwell 1989). 
101 Albertina Albors Llorens, 'The European Court of Justice, more than a teleological 
court' (1999) 2 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 373. 
102 Isabel Schübel-Pfister, Sprache und Gemeinschaftsrecht: die Auslegung der mehrsprachig 
verbindlichen Rechtstexte durch den Europäischen Gerichtshof (Duncker & Humblot 
2004). 
103 Similarly, Buck refers to grammatikalische Auslegung, systematische Auslegung,  
teleologische Auslegung and historische Auslegung. Carsten Buck, Über die 
Auslegungsmethoden des Gerichtshofs der Europäische Gemeinschaft (Peter Lang 1997). 
104 Pierre Pescatore, 'Interprétation des lois et conventions plurilingues dans la 
Communauté européenne' (n 7). 
105 Berteloot uses the same categories in German: reduzierende' Methode and meta-
linguistische Methode. Pascale Berteloot, 'Die Europäische Union und ihre 
mehrsprachigen Rechtstexte' in Isolde Burr & Friedrich Müller (eds), Rechtssprache 
Europas (Duncker & Humblot 2004). 
106 Cornelis Jaap W. Baaij, 'Fifty years of Multilingual Interpretation in the European 
Union' (n 13); Cornelis Jaap W. Baaij, Legal integration and language diversity: The case 
for source-oriented EU translation (Digital Academic Repository, University of 
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I refer to linguistic interpretation and metalinguistic interpretation. 
Metalinguistic interpretation is equivalent to the teleological-systematic 
interpretation in that it goes beyond the words, also called 'teleo-systemic' 
interpretation.108 As Kutscher affirms, teleological interpretation is closely 
linked to schematic interpretation and it is difficult to draw a clear line 
between them.109 
This applied study shows that linguistic arguments were used in the cases in 
Group 2 (soft cases): 
Linguistic Interpretation  
NEW WAVE 
CZ 
* Comparison to clear the divergence. 
Onix Asigurări * The need for a uniform interpretation of EU 
regulations makes it impossible, where there are 
doubts, for the text of a provision to be considered in 
isolation but requires, on the contrary, that it should be 
interpreted and applied in the light of the versions 
existing in the other official languages. 
* Comparison to clear the divergence.  
Khorassani * It is necessary to consider not only its wording but 
also the context in which it occurs and the objectives 
pursued by the rules of which it is part.  
* Comparison to clear the divergence.  
 
Throughout the case-law, the CJEU settled the normative requirement to 
compare different language versions by claiming that when interpreting a 
certain provision, 'where there are doubts', we must do it 'in the light of the 
versions existing in the other official languages' (as in the Onix Asigurări case). 
                                                 
108 Joxerramon Bengoetxea The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice (n 14) 
250. 
109 Hans Kutscher, Methods of interpretation as seen by a judge at the Court of Justice (n 99) 
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In other earlier cases the Court did not mention 'in case of doubt' or 'where 
there are doubts'. In Kraaijeveld it referred to comparison as a requirement: 
'interpretation of a provision of Community law involves a comparison of the 
language versions.'110 In addition, in the Ferriere case, the Court stated that all 
language versions must be consulted even if the version at hand is clear and 
unambiguous in isolation.111 
On the contrary, metalinguistic arguments were used in the Group 1 cases 
(hard cases).  





* The wording used in one language version of a 
provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for 
the interpretation of that provision or be given priority 
over the other language versions. 
* The wording used in one language version of a 
provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for 
the interpretation of that provision, or be made to 
override the other language versions in that regard. 
* Provisions of EU law must be interpreted and applied 
uniformly in the light of the versions existing in all EU 
languages. 
* Where there is divergence between the various 
language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision 
in question must be interpreted by reference to the 
general scheme and purpose of the rules of which it 
forms part. 
                                                 
110 Case C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV e.a. v Gedeputeerde Staten van 
Zuid-Holland, EU:C:1996:404, para 25. 
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Sharda Europe * The wording used in one language version of a 
provision of EU law cannot serve as the sole basis for 
the interpretation of that provision or be given priority 
over the other language versions. 
* The need for uniform application and, therefore, for 
uniform interpretation of an EU measure precludes one 
version of the text being considered in isolation, but 
requires that the measure be interpreted by reference to 
the general scheme and purpose of the rules of which it 
forms part. 
Pinckernelle * For the purpose of interpreting a provision of EU law it 
is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the 
context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by 
the rules of which it is part. 
* Comparison revealed a divergence 
* Analysis of the context to clarify the question 
Al Chodor * Where the various language versions differ, the scope 
of the provision in question cannot be determined on 
the basis of an interpretation which is exclusively 
textual, but must be interpreted by reference to the 
purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it 
forms part. 
Vilkas * The need for a uniform interpretation of a provision of 
EU law makes it impossible for the text of a provision to 
be considered, in case of doubt, in isolation but requires, 
on the contrary, that it should be interpreted on the basis 
of both the actual intention of the legislature and the 
objective pursued by the latter, in light, in particular, 
of the versions drawn up in all languages. 
 
In Popescu, GE Healthcare, ERGO Poist'ovňa and Sharda Europe, the Court used 
practically the same arguments. In Pinckernelle and Al Chodor, the Court 
mentions that textual interpretation is not enough: we need to move on to 
the context and purpose of the rules. Finally, in Vilkas, the Court resorted to 
the intention of the legislature. In fact, the Court analysed the history of the 
provision in order to figure out what the intention was. The Court first 
observed that the wording used in the article in question had its origin in a 
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previous Convention.112 Then, different language versions of this Convention 
were compared. The Court also examined the explanatory report relating to 
the Convention in its various language versions.113 In addition, the Court also 
studied the explanatory memorandum to the Commission's proposal that led 
to the adoption of the Framework Decision.114 The Court was then able to 
deduce the intention of the legislature: 'These various factors contribute to 
demonstrating that the use in various language versions of that latter concept 
does not indicate that the EU legislature intended to' [...].115 
IV. TYPES OF DIVERGENCES 
This section focuses on the types of divergences that came to light in the 
study of the case-law. In Group 1 and Group 2, I examined the types of 
linguistic divergences that appear between different language versions of a 
piece of legislation. Classifying the types of divergences is not easy and some 
authors acknowledge the difficulty of classification in linguistics:  
A language is vastly more complex than an automobile engine, and linguistic 
items, being multi-functional, can be looked at from more than one point of 
view, and hence given more than one label on different occasions even within 
the same analytical framework.116  
Therefore, it is not possible to establish rigid categorisation. However, there 
are some studies that provide a classification of divergences or of types of 
translation problems. Among the main works that have dealt with this issue, 
Kerstin Loehr provides a classification between two main groups: 
Divergenzen im Text and Divergenzen im Denken.117 Divergenzen im Text are 
                                                 
112 Nord v Commission (n 111) para 48. 
113 Ibid para 50. 
114 Ibid para 51. 
115 Ibid para 52. 
116 Sharon O'Brien, 'Controlling Controlled English. An Analysis of Several 
Controlled Language Rule Sets Obtaining the Rule Sets', Conference proceedings: 
Joint Conference combining the 8th International Workshop of the European Association 
for Machine Translation and the 4th Controlled Language Application Workshop (EAMT 
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analysis of English: a Hallidayan approach (Arnold 1995) 15. 
117 Kerstin Loehr, Mehrsprachigkeitsprobleme in der Europäischen Union (Peter Lang 
1997) 57. 
2018} Multilingual EU Law 39 
textual divergences which are possible to avoid, and Divergenzen im Denken 
are conceptual divergences which are harder to avoid. 
Both Šarčević118 and Schübel-Pfister119 mention the classification proposed 
by Loehr. Šarčević remarks that divergences can be studied within the lexical 
field, but that they can also appear in the syntactical and pragmatic fields.120 
Schübel-Pfister explains that Loehr's linguistic perspective coincides 
partially with a legal perspective. She also distinguishes between Divergenzen 
im Text and Divergenzen im Sinn but calls them Begriffsdivergenzen and 
Bedeutungsdivergenzen respectively. She explains that Begriffsdivergenze can 
also be referred to as Textdivergenzen (textual divergence) and 
Bedeutungsdivergenzen (conceptual divergence) as Sinndivergenzen.121  
Geert Val Calster122 refers to 'obscurities' in the texts. He proposes the 
following categories:  
- one version says something different than the other(s); there is a clear 
conflict between different versions;  
- one text uses a word without any meaning, or with an uncertain sense; the 
corresponding word in the other(s) is clear;  
- in one text, a word is used with two or more meanings; the other version's 
term contains only one of those meanings;  
- the word used in one text has a wider meaning than the corresponding word 
in the other(s) and a text uses a category which does not figure in the other(s).  
Pablo Dengler provides a similar classification to that of Van Calster. He 
looks at the degree of divergence. If the language versions differ completely, 
he calls it divergencia abierta (open divergence). If the language versions do not 
differ completely but their scope is somewhat different, he calls it divergencia 
                                                 
118 Susan Šarčević, 'Die Übersetzung von mehrsprachigen EU-Rechtsvorschriften' in 
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119 Isabel Schübel Pfister, Sprache und Gemeinschaftsrecht (n 102). 
120 Šarčević (n 118) 125. 
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parcial (partial divergence).123 He includes conceptual divergences and 
divergences because of terminological asymmetry in the same group (partial 
divergences). However, if there is terminological asymmetry or if a certain 
element is omitted in a language version, the result can be that the language 
versions have completely opposite meanings and would therefore be 
considered 'open divergence'. For this reason, Dengler's classification 
according to the degree of disparity may be difficult to apply systematically. 
In addition, Lawrence Solan mentions that there can be problems of 'word 
choice' or 'grammatical nuances'.124 In one of his works, Baaij divides the 
types of discrepancies into 'translation errors' and 'semantic scope'.125 In the 
case of 'translation errors', discrepancies entail the use of distinctly different 
terms in the various language versions. He claims that 'even when the CJEU 
does not explicitly believe that a translation error is to blame, it seems that 
the CJEU is generally more likely to treat these types of discrepancies as 
'textual flaws''.126  However, in my opinion, translation is not always to blame 
when there are textual flaws. This category of 'translation errors' does not 
seem to represent a type of linguistic divergence. Whether the problem was 
caused by an inaccurate translation is another question that should be 
resolved afterwards. Regarding the 'semantic scope', Baaij points out that 
'differences in the scope of terminology in the various language versions may 
not be an error, but merely a natural and unavoidable trait of translation'.127 
In a later work he divides the case into 'semantic and syntactic 
discrepancies'.128 
Most authors tend to distinguish divergences that appear at a grammatical-
syntactical level and those that appear at a lexical-semantic level. Both 
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Loehr129 and Šarčević130 suggest considering the three areas within the field of 
semiotics: syntax (or syntactics), semantics and pragmatics. This threefold 
classification 'goes back to Peirce, but was first drawn and made familiar by 
Morris'.131 The classification I propose is, therefore, not guided strictly 
according to the three fields (syntax, semantics and pragmatics) but they are 
all related to it. The most structural-systemic aspects of language are grouped 
under 'structural-grammatical divergences', while the lexical level of 
discourse is described under 'lexical-conceptual divergences'. I therefore 
classify divergences according to:  
1) Structural-grammatical divergences  
2) Lexical-conceptual divergences 
As the cases were described in detail in section 2, I summarise the types of 
divergences in the following tables. 
1. Structural-Grammatical Divergences 
Addition of syntactic unit in one language version 
GE Healthcare The German version contained the additional 
term Zahlung an diese dritte Person. 
Other aspects of syntax 
Sharda Europe It is not clear which part of the sentence the 
adverbial clause of time modifies. 
ERGO Poist'ovňa Three language versions did not contain wording 
which could be translated as 'to the extent that'. 
Onix Asigurări In a noun phrase: irregularities within their 
territories v irregularities committed in their 
territories. 
Pinckernelle It is not clear which part of the sentence the 
adverbial phrase modifies. 
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Popescu The problem was the expression in Romanian 
(drept de conducere acordat).  
2. Lexical-Conceptual Divergences 
Khorassani 
The German version used an expression that had 
a more restricted meaning (zum Gegenstand haben 
v. 'in relation to'). 
Al Chodor 
The problem revolved around the use of the term 
'defined by law' v. laid down in legislation. 
Vilkas 
The problem revolved around the use of the term 
force majeure v. 'circumstances beyond the 
control'. 
NEW WAVE CZ 
The problem revolved around the use of the term 
'in the context of proceedings' v. within the 
framework of proceedings. 
 
When we delve into the types of divergences, a common question that can be 
considered is whether discrepancies between different language versions are 
to be attributed to a translation problem. A defective translation is indeed 
the reason for linguistic divergence in some of the cases. For example, in 
Sharda Europe the provision in Spanish was not expressed correctly. 
Translators must have utmost care with adverbials because syntactic aspects 
can lead to semantic problems. We have seen that depending on the position 
of the adverbial, it can modify one part of the sentence or the other, having 
serious legal consequences. 
In other cases, the responsibility of translators in not so clear. For this reason, 
instead of saying whether a certain translation is correct or incorrect, I think 
that it would be more appropriate to talk about adequacy.132 In the Vilkas 
                                                 
132 See, for instance, Le Chen and Kin Kui, 'Terminological equivalence in legal 
translation: A semiotic approach'(2008) 172 Semiotica 33; Fernando Prieto Ramos, 
'International and supranational law in translation: From multilingual lawmaking 
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case, the problem of interpretation revolved around the concept of force 
majeur. Some language versions did not use this term and expressed the same 
idea with a different expression. It could be argued that 'circumstances 
beyond the control' expresses the same idea. However, as the CJEU 
explained in the judgement, there is settled case-law in various spheres of EU 
law that deal with the concept of force majeure.133 Translators who are aware 
and informed should take into account if a certain term has been interpreted 
in the context of EU law. Translations will normally achieve a higher level of 
adequacy if translators carry out a good contextualization of the translation 
task.134 
In addition, I do not think it is fair to attribute all shortcomings to 
multilingual interpretation to translation.135 In this regard, we must bear in 
mind that legal norms are expressed in natural language; as a consequence, 
ambiguity, vagueness and open texture are inevitable, even if legislation is 
monolingual.136 This suggests that we need to move away from a positivist 
approach that relies on a 'strong language theory'.137 Supporters of this theory 
assume that legal norms carry 'autonomous and pre-interpretive meaning'.138 
This implies that 'judicial decisions would be exempt from value judgements 
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and deprived of discretion'.139 In order to understand how multilingual EU 
law actually works, we need to consider that meaning is created in context 
and depends on the discourses in which it occurs.140 Legal concepts are not 
fixed entities; 'they can and do change'.141 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This applied study has addressed three main points. First, as for the use of 
comparison, I have found that most cases of comparison of language versions 
carried out by the CJEU (71%) involve some kind of divergence; the rest (29%) 
are cases in which comparison is used to confirm an interpretation. Second, 
from the total number of cases that include some divergence, 70% are 'G1-
Hard cases'. This study has revealed a correlation between the 'hard cases' 
and metalinguistic interpretation. Third, regarding the types of divergences, 
most cases (70%) are 'structural-grammatical' divergences and the rest are 
'lexical-conceptual' divergences. No correlation can be established between 
the type of divergence and the method of interpretation; i.e. 'structural-
grammatical' divergences involve either metalinguistic or linguistic 
interpretation. 
The study of divergences that emerge between different language versions is 
of paramount importance because it touches upon the question of uniform 
application and interpretation of EU law. The cases explored here provide an 
overview of the type of linguistic issues that come to light in multilingual 
interpretation by the CJEU. 
I propose an informed and reasoned approach to deal with the implications 
of EU law multilingualism in relation to four points. The first point concerns 
the creation of EU law. The role of translators as key actors in law-making 
must be kept in mind. They produce legislation that is legally binding and, 
therefore, there should be more collaboration between drafters, translators 
and lawyer linguists. Translators could have a greater role by participating 
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more in certain discussions when deciding the content of legislation. This 
would help translators understand the nuances of certain provisions, as EU 
law is 'negotiated legislation' and legislation normally passes through three 
institutions (the ordinary legislative procedure being 'the main decision-
making procedure used for adopting EU legislation').142 Efforts should be 
focused on improving the legislative technique so that legislation is as clear as 
possible. As Strandvik also maintains, it is necessary to raise awareness and 
provide 'formal training in legislative drafting, terminology and 
translation'.143 It may not be possible to remove the challenges that are 
inherent to translation. However, 'by raising awareness about them, we can 
try to approach them differently, untangle and review our norms, beliefs and 
values, and update our working routines'.144 
The second point concerning a new approach relates to the application and 
interpretation of EU legislation. No strict division between the different 
tasks surrounding the creation and interpretation of EU law can be drawn. 
Translators need to be aware of the hermeneutic principles that the CJEU 
applies when interpreting EU law, especially when the Court reconciles 
diverging language versions. Bengoetxea explains that 'genuine multilingual 
legal reasoning occurs at the stage of translation much more so than at the 
stage of drafting or even deliberation'. The translator 'is bound by a closed 
and circumscribed universe of meaning'.145  
The third aspect of this new way of thinking is to accept that divergences are 
inevitable. It is not a question of establishing English, for example, as the only 
source text for drafting and interpretation of EU legislation.146 Ambiguity 
and vagueness are inherent to natural languages. National courts should be 
more familiar with linguistic issues in EU law, even if only to have the 
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awareness that different linguistic versions can make the interpretation at 
hand a bit more complex than they often assume.  
The fourth feature of this new way of thinking refers to the great potential 
that comparison between language versions offers. Comparison can help to 
elucidate unclear provisions and discover divergences that would otherwise 
go unnoticed. We must keep in mind that apparent clarity is 'no guarantee of 
absence of divergence'.147 How can we know that a text is clear if we do not 
check the other language versions? We must recall Watkin's idea, which 
claims that awareness of the inherent flexibility of language should be enough 
to persuade us that comparison is a necessary step.148 
This study has shown, however, that linguistic comparison was employed in 
only about 3% of the total amount of cases decided by the CJEU. This 
demonstrates there is a wide gap between the normative requirements to 
compare different language versions and the reality of its application.149 I 
consider that the CJEU, as the guarantor of uniform application and 
interpretation of EU legislation, has the capacity and duty to become a real 
multilingual court.
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